Rule 3:18(d): What Does It Mean? by Spainhour, T. H.
William and Mary Review of Virginia Law
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 6
Rule 3:18(d): What Does It Mean?
T. H. Spainhour
Copyright c 1955 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval
Repository Citation
T. H. Spainhour, Rule 3:18(d): What Does It Mean?, 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 114 (1955),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss2/6
Rule 3:18[dJ: What Does It Mean?
Every pleading shall state the facts on which the party
relies in numbered paragraphs, and it shall be sufficient if it
clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature of the
claim or defense. An allegation of negligence or contributory
negligence is sufficient without specifying the particulars of
the negligence. On motion made promptly, a bill or particu-
lars may be ordered to amplify any pleading that does not,
in the opinion of the court, comply with this Rule. A bill of
particulars that fails to inform the opposite party fairly of the
true nature of the claim or defense may, on motion made
promptly, be stricken and an amended bill of particulars
ordered. If the amended bill of particulars fails to inform
the opposite party fairly of the true nature of the claim or
defense, the pleading not so amplified and the bills of par-
ticulars may be stricken.
Every order requiring a bill or amended bill of particu-
lars shall fix the time within which it is to be filed. Va. Rules
of Court 3:18(d).
Since the Virginia Rules of Court became effective in 1950
there have been few cases which mention Rule 3:18(d) or
interpret it in any way. Even those cases that have made mention
of the Rule are of little help in determining its correct interpreta-
tion or the way in which the courts will apply it in the future.
Therefore, in attempting to arrive at the correct meaning of the
Rule we must depend on (1) the law as it existed prior to the
adoption of the Rules; (2) the meaning given to certain expres-
sions or phrases contained in the Rule when those expressions or
phrases have been used elsewhere by the Court; (3) the gram-
matical construction of the Rule; and (4) the intent of the
Court in adopting the Rules.
The difficulty arises when one attempts to find in the Rule
a test to be applied by the trial courts to determine whether a
bill of particulars will be ordered to supplement or amplify a
pleading when such bill is requested.
The Rule states:
Every pleading shall state the facts on which the party
relies in numbered paragraphs...
There seems to be no ambiguity in this statement nor any
confusion as to its meaning or purpose. The Judicial Council
for Virginia in commenting in 1949 on the then proposed Rules
said, 'The paragraphs of pleading should be numbered so that
they can be more easily referred to."1
The Rule continues:
... and it shall be sufficient if it clearly informs the oppo-
site party of the true nature of the claim or defense....
The difficulty in interpretation and application begins here.
In view of the fact that this sub-paragraph deals with bills of
particulars, it appears that this is the test to be applied by the
court to determine whether a bill of particulars will be ordered
when one is requested. The Judicial Council commented, "If
a pleading 'clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature
of the claim or defense' the court ought not to order a bill of
particulars."2
However, it will be noted that the test here is stated in the
same words as the test which has been applied, both before
and after the adoption of the Rules, to determine the sufficiency
of a pleading when the opposing party has demurred to such
pleading. In Mankin v. Aldridge,3 decided in 1919, the Supreme
Court of Appeals said in deciding whether a demurrer should
have been sustained by the trial court:
The tendency of modem times is to simplify matters of
mere procedure, and for this reason the procedure by mo-
tion is looked upon with great indulgence, and notices are
upheld as sufficient, however informal, where they contain
sufficient in substance to fairly apprise the defendant of the
nature of the demand made upon him, and state sufficient
facts to enable the court to say that if the facts stated are
proved, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.... The notice
must, in substance, comply with these requirements, else
it is bad on demurrer.4 (Emphasis added)
I The Judicial Council for Virginia Proposed Modificatios of Practice and Procedure
27 (1949) (hereinafter cited as Proposed Modifications).
'Ibid.
8 127 Va. 761, 105 S.E. 459 (1919).
6 Id. at 765, 105 S.E. 459, 460.
In Alexander v. Kuykendal,5 decided in 1951, the Supreme
Court of Appeals said:
.The substance of this and other decisions of this court is
that even though a declaration or motion for judgment may
be imperfect, if it is so drafted that the defendant cannot
mistake the true nature of the claim, the trial court should
overrule the demurrer, and if the defendant desires more
definite information, or a more specific statement of the
grounds of the complaint, he should request the court to
require plaintiff to file a bill of particulars.8 (Emphasis
added)
This statement is also quoted by the court in Creenbrier Farms
v. Clarke,7 decided in 1952.
It will be noted that in each of these cases the Court makes
statements that indicate that a good cause of action must be
stated. In Mankin v. Aldridge the Court says that the pleading
must "state sufficient facts to enable the court to say that if the
facts stated are proved, the plaintiff is entitled to recover."8
In Alexander v. Kuykendall it is said:
The plaintiff does not expressly allege that she believed
or relied on the representations, but she does allege that, "by
virtue of said representation to * * * plaintiff that said
marriage was valid * * * plaintiff married the defendant."
The words "by virtue of," are used in the sense of "because"
or "relied upon."9
In Greenbrier Farms v. Clarke it is stated:
The object of a motion for judgment or declaration is to
set forth the facts which constitute the cause of action so
that they may be understood by the defendant who is to
answer them, by the jury who are to ascertain whether
such facts exist, and by the court which is to give judg-
ment 10
6192 Va. 8, 63 S.E.2d 746 (1951).
'Id. at 14, 63 S.E.2d 746, 749.
193 Va. 891, 894, 71 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1952).
' 127 Va. 761, 765. 105 S.E. 459, 460 (1919).
192 Va. 8,1, h 63 S.E.2d 746, 749 (1951).
10 193 Va. 891, 894, 71 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1952).
Two sections of the Virginia Code also deal with the matter
of sufficiency of pleadings on demurrer." In different words
they state the same guiding principle as the cases quoted above.
Without deciding which interpretation should be given to
the first sentence of this sub-paragraph, let us consider the second
sentence for some possible enlightenment:
An allegation of negligence or contributory negligence is
sufficient without specifying the particulars of the negli-
gence.
This sentence was originally proposed as a separate sub-
paragraph of the Rule,12 and in its comments on the proposed
rules the Judicial Council said:
It should not be necessary to specify the particulars of
negligence unless the court orders a bill of particulars, and
the court should not order a bill of particulars unless
satisfied that the moving party does not know the grounds
of the claim in sufficient detail to prepare his defense. In
most cases the defendant or his agent was present at the
accident and is present in court.13 (Emphasis added)
Considering this sentence alone, and in view of the above
comment, it seems clear that it means that the pleading is suffi-
cient against demurrer. That would have appeared to be the
intent, at least so long as it remained a separate sub-paragraph.
Since the comment says it should not be necessary to specify the
particulars of negligence "unless the court orders a bill of par-
ticulars," the sentence certainly cannot mean that a bill of par-
ticulars will not be ordered in any case but will be ordered under
appropriate circumstances. This interpretation seems correct in
view of Section 8-109, Virginia Code of 1950, which read at
the time of the adoption of the Rules: "... . nor shall a demurrer
be sustained to a declaration alleging negligence of the defend-
ant because the particlars of the negligence are not stated, but
such particulars may be demanded by the defendant uider Sec-
tion 8-111." The General Assembly seems to have interpreted
11Va. Code §8-102, §8-109 (1950).
22 See Proposed Modifications at 22.
L. Id. at 28.
this sentence in its present form and context to mean sufficient
against demurrer. At the 1954 session the above quoted sentence
was deleted from Section 8-109 of the Code and the annotation
to the Section in the 1954 cumulative supplement to the Code
states: "The 1954 amendment . . . deleted the former second
sentence covering matters rendered obsolete by Rule 3:18."
(Emphasis added)
Now if one attempts to read the two sentences together, as-
suming that "sufficient" means the same in both, the argument
seems stronger that the correct meaning is sufficient against de-
murer. In order to make the second sentence mean anything
other than sufficient against demurrer, it is necessary to (1) de-
cide that the first sentence does not mean sufficient against de-
murrer, but rather that it means sufficient that a bill of particulars
will not be ordered; and (2) read the second sentence with the
stated test added, i.e., "An allegation of negligence or contributory
negligence is sufficient without specifying the particulars of the
negligence if it dearly informs the opposite party of the true
nature of the claim or defense."
The third sentence of the Rule states:
On motion made promptly, a bill of particulars may be
ordered to amplify -any pleading that does not, in the
opinion of the court, comply with this Rule.
This sentence should clear up any doubts as to the proper
meaning of the preceding sentences. The phrase "any pleading
that does not.., comply with this Rule7 must mean any pleading
that is insufficient when tested according to the preceding sen-
tences.
If the first sentence means sufficient against demurrer, then
the third sentence says that a bill of particulars will be ordered
to ainilify any pleading that would be considered insufficient
on demurrer. If the second sentence means sufficient against de-
murrer, it renders the third sentence meaningless as regards a
pleading that alleges negligence because any-pleading that alleges
negligence does comply with this Rule without specifying the
particulars of the negligence. With this interpretation, a party
would have a choice of demurring or requesting a bill of par-
ticulars. It is hardly likely that a bill of particulars would be
requested when the party might win his case by demurring. This
would also mean that a court, having overruled a demurrer
would not order a bill of particulars. This clearly is not the
correct meaning of the Rule. This is contrary to established
law. The Court has repeatedly said, after deciding that a de-
murrer should have been overruled, that the party could re-
quest a bill of particulars.
It seems clear now that the first two sentences do not mean
suffiient against demurrer, but spell out a test to be applied by
the courts to determine whether a bill of particulars will be
ordered. The test stated in the first sentence must be added to
the second sentence as indicated above. With this meaning, the
third sentence now says that a bill of particulars may be ordered
to amplify any pleading that does not clearly inform the opposite
party of the true nature of the claim or defense.
It has been correctly stated in a recent article:
Since one of the tests for purposes of demurrer is whether
the party is informed of the true nature of the claim or
defense, it is clear that this cannot also be the test of
whether a bill of particulars should be ordered. . . . In
commenting upon the necessity of a bill of particulars in
a negligence action, the committee has stated that the test
is whether the moving party knows the grounds of the
claim in sufficient detail to prepare his defense.14 (Empha-
sis sic)
The test indicated here, then, cannot be, and is not, the
same test which the court has applied when considering a de-
murrer despite the fact that the same words have been used
in both instances to describe the test. The test here goes fur-
ther and requires for sufficiency that the pleading apprise the
opposite party of the true nature of the claim or defense in
suffcient detail that he can prepare his defense (or reply).
ZU Phelps, Tke Bill of Particulars in Virginia, 39 Va.L.Rev. 989, 991 (1953).Th
committee to which Professor Phelps refers is the Judicial Council for Virgmi.
The statement to which he refers is quoted in part on page 116 supra.
In Bryant v. Foxs Adnr,15 decided in 1923, a declaration
was held good on demurrer which alleged that the defendant's
employee "did negligently and recklessly run into and collide
with one John A. Fox, now deceased, who was riding a motor-
cycle on the overhead bridge on Washington Street extended,"
and a bill of particulars was ordered. The pleading did inform
the defendant of the true nature of the claim so that the demur-
rer was overruled, but it did not inform him in sufficient detail
that he could prepare his defense, so a bill of particulars was
ordered.
In Miller v. Grier S. Johnson, Inc.,16 decided in 1951, the
plaintiff alleged in its motion for judgment that defendant was
indebted to it in certain amounts "upon an open account as
is shown by the itemized statement of said account and the
affidavit hereto attached and filed herewith." No itemized ac-
account was attached or filed. An affidavit was attached and
made a part of the motion that defendant was "truly and justly
indebted" to the plaintiff "in the aggregate principal sum of
S... $3,100.00" with interest "for work and labor done and for
materials furnished on instructions of the said Louise H. Miller,
and pursuant to verbal agreements with her made." The de-
fendant demurred to the pleadings claiming that the failure to
file the itemized account violated Code Section 8-270. The de-
murrer was overruled and a bill of particulars was ordered and
filed. The Supreme Court of Appeals said:
Plaintiff, in its motion for judgment, its affidavits and its
bill of particulars, stated a good cause of action, and stated
it in such a way that defendant could not reasonably have
mistaken the nature of the action upon which plaintiff pred-
icated its claim.
... If she thought that the bill of particulars did not give her
the necessary information to prepare her defense, she could
have moved for an amended bill of particulars. 17
The above quotations from Alexander v. Kuykendall'8 and
from Greenbrier Farms v. Clarke19 indicate that a bill of par-
a t35 Va. 296, 303, 116 S.E. 459, 461 (1923).
16 191 Va. 768, 776 62 S .2d 870, 874 (1951).
1 Id. at 778, 62 S.1E.2d 870. 875.
18 See p. 115 pra.
IS Ibid.
ticulars will be ordered to amplify a pleading that does inform
the opposite party of the true nature of the claim but not in
sufficient detail that the party can prepare his defense.
The decision whether to order a bill of particulars or not is
within the sound discretion of the court, but is subject to review.
The rule stated in City of Portsmouth v. Weiss,20 decided in
1926, is still applicable:
The granting or refusing of a bill of particulars lies in the
sound judicial discretion of the trial court but its action is
subject to review by this court, and will be 'reversed where
the failure to require such bill, upon a request, was plainly
prejudicial to the adverse party. The object of the statute
was to enable the adverse party to prepare his case for
trial and to prevent surprise. We have repeatedly said that
every litigant is entitled to be told by his adversary in
plain and explicit language what is his ground of complaint
or defense. The object of litigation is to do justice between
the parties, and this cannot be done unless each one is given
reasonable notice of the claims or defense of the other, and
is afforded a fair opportunity to controvert them. If the
pleadings do not give the information necessary to enable
the adverse party to intelligently concert his reply, then he
is entitled to a bill of particulars giving such information,
and it is error to refuse it.21
The remainder of the Rule states a remedy available to a
party when the opposing party has been ordered to file a bill of
of particulars but, when filed, the pleadings still do not inform
the party fairly of the true nature of the claim or defense in
sufficient detail that a defense may be prepared. The Judicial
Council commented regarding a declaration alleging negligence:
If a bill of particulars is ordered, the party should not be
deemed to have complied with the order if he pleads: "the
defendant violated each and every clause, section, and
paragraph of the Motor Vehicle Code." Since a bill of
particulars should be ordered only when clarification is
necessary, real clarification should be insisted on.2
-0 145 Va. 94, 133 S.E. 781 (1926).
I Id. at 111, 133 S.E. 781, 786.
22 Proposed Modifications at 28.
The quotation from Miller v. Grier S. Johnson, Inc.,2 3 indi-
cates that the test to be applied to a bill of particulars, under the
second half of the Rule, is also whether the opposing party is
informed of the true nature of the claim or defense in sufficient
detail to prepare his idefense.
The Judicial Council commented:
The provision in Rule 1 that the established practice and
procedure are continued in matters not covered by the
rules is inserted to make it clear that all existing statutes
and judicial decisions are unaffected except insofar as ex-
press changes are made. For example, the body of case law
holding that the facts in a notice of motion for judgment
may be stated simply and informally will continue to govern
... 24 (Emphasis added)
In view of this comment, it is submitted that neither the
Council nor the Supreme Court of Appeals ever intended that
Rule 3:18(d) should apply when a demurrer is being considered.
In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Young,25 decided in 1952,
the Court said:
Defendant's first contention is that the trial court committed
reversible error in overruling its demurrer to plaintiff's mo-
tion and bill of particulars.. .. we think the motion and
bill of particulars fully complied with Rule of Court 3:18(d)
in that they fairly informed defendant of the true nature of
plaintiff's claim.26
From this statement it might be inferred that the Court was
applying the test in Rule 3:18(d) when considering a demurrer
and that therefore the Supreme Court of Appeals has interpreted
the Rule to be applicable when a pleading is tested by demur-
rer. It would seem, however, that the Court merely looked at
the demurrer for what it actually was, or considered it for what
it should have been under the Rule, i.e., a motion to strike the
pleadings. Then, having decided that the motion and bill of
22 See p. 119 .mfra.
24 Proposed Modifications at 23.
19S Va. 671, 79 S.E.2d 858 (19S2).
1Id. at 672, 79 S.E.2d 8S8, 859.
particulars met the test stated in the Rule, a motion to strike
should have been overruled.
The following conclusions are submitted by way of summary:
(1) It was the intention of the Supreme Court of Appeals,
in adopting the Rule, to state a test to be applied by the trial
courts to determine whether a bill of particulars should be ordered
when one has been requested.
(2) The Rule is not well drafted in that it does not clearly
and completely state the Rule as it was intended.
(3) The test as to whether a bill of particulars will be
ordered is the same under this Rule as that which has been used
in the past, and that test is: Does the pleading inform the oppos-
ing party of the true nature of the claim or defense in sufficient
detail that he can prepare his defense?
(4) The confusion that this Rule has caused is the result
of having used the same expression here to describe a certain
test as the expression used elsewhere to describe a different test.
(5) The General Assembly interpreted this Rule to apply
to sufficiency of a pleading against demurrer and as a result of
this interpretation repealed a portion of Code Section 8-109
which related to demurrer.
(6) Sufficiency of a pleading against demurrer will still
be tested under Code Sections 8-102 and 8-109 and the body of
case law that has dealt with that question.
(7) The following paraphrased version of Rule 3:18(d) will
convey the intended meaning of the Rule:
Every pleading shall state the facts on which the party
relies in numbered paragraphs. On motion made promptly,
a bill of particulars may be ordered to amplify any pleading
that does not, in the opinion of the court, clearly inform the
opposite party of the true nature of the claim or defense in
sufficient detail that he may prepare his defense. Bills of
particulars shall not be required to amplify any pleading
that alleges negligence or contributory negligence, if, in
the opinion of the court, the opposing party knows the true
nature of the claim or defense in sufficient detail to prepare
his defense. A bill of particulars that fails to inform the
opposite party fairly of the true nature of the claim or de-
fense in sufficient detail may, on motion made promptly,
be stricken and an amended bill of particulars ordered. If
the amended bill of particulars fails to properly clarify the
pleadings, so that, in the opinion of the court, the opposing
party cannot reasonably be able to prepare his defense, the
pleading not so amplified and the bills of particulars may
be stricken.
Every order requiring a bill or amended bill of particu-
lars shall fix the time within which it is to be filed.
(8) Code Section 8-111 is still effective and a party may
still proceed under that Section to exclude evidence on any mat-
ter not sufficiently described in the pleadings.
However, in view of the statement of the court in Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Young27 and the action of the General
Assembly in repealing part of Code Section 8-109, it seems that
there is a definite possibility that the Rule will be interpreted
to apply to the sufficiency of pleadings against demurrer. As
has been stated, the grammatical construction of the Rule be-'
lies this interpretation, but no greater change in its construction
would be necessary to clearly give it this meaning than would
be necessary to clarify the Rule according to the meaning ad-
vanced above. Neither of the first two sentences would need
any change at all. The remainder of the Rule could be changed
to state the test to be applied to determine whether a bill of
particulars will be ordered and to state the remedy of the moving
party when a pleading is not then adequately particularized.
The Rule might then read as follows:
Every pleading shall state the facts on which the party
relies in numbered paragraphs, and it shall be sufficient if it
clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature of the
claim or defense. An allegation of negligence or contnbu-
tory negligence is sufficient without specifying the particu-
lars of the negligence. On motion made promptly, a bill
"See p. 121 supra.
of particulars may be ordered to amplify any pleading that
does not, in the opinion of the court, give the opposing party
sufficient details that he can prepare his defense. A bill of
particulars that fails to inform the opposite party fairly of
the true nature of the claim or defense in sufficient detail
that he can prepare his defense may, on motion made
promptly, be stricken and an amended bill of particulars
ordered. If the amended bill of particulars fails to inform
the opposite party fairly of the true nature of the claim or
defense in sufficient detail that he may prepare his defense,
the pleading not so amplified and the bills of particulars
may be stricken.
Every order requiring a bill -or amended bill of particu-
lars shall fix the time within which it is to be filed.
This version of the Rule would leave the first two sentences
to be interpreted in the light of past usage of the phrases therein.
Since those phrases have never been used other than in the pre-
sent Rule as applicable to anything other than a demurrer, they
would necessarily apply only to sufficiency against demurrer.
With this construction and interpretation the Rule would render
obsolete that part of the Code Section 8-109 which was repealed,
it would state clearly when a bill of particulars would be ordered,
and it would distinguish between "sufficient against demurrer"
and "sufficient that a bill of particulars will not be ordered."
Finally, it is submitted that whichever meaning is to be
given to Rule 3:18(d) the Rule is in need of revision so that the
meaning intended will be clear.
T. H. Spainhour
